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Introduction
Stewart Macaulay’s seminal 1963 article “Non-Contrac-
tual Relations in Business” explored why merchants 
and manufacturers often fail to plan their commercial 
relationships and why they seldom resort to legal sanc-
tions to settle disputes. Macaulay found that, in many 
business exchanges, detailed planning and legal sanc-
tions play only a small role. His tentative explanation 
was that businesses prefer to deal with people or organ-
izations they trust based on their prior dealings or their 
reputation. According to Macaulay, a manifestation of 
trust might be a brief conversation followed by a hand-
shake. The rationale is that, if parties cannot rely on 
promises as being made in good faith, and plan for the 
future accordingly, the cost of uncertainty would make 
conducting business impossible. However, this ap-
proach to contracting frustrates lawyers, who advise 
their clients to plan for contingencies and formalize 
their business arrangements. 
This article will apply Macaulay’s behavioural analysis 
of business exchanges to smart contracts. In particular, 
it will examine the way that blockchain can provide and 
build trust and reputation while also managing the per-
formance of the exchange. Once the management of 
performance of a smart contract is explained and un-
derstood, it is possible to give expression to the way 
that blockchain manages good faith in online business 
exchanges. In this way, blockchain solves a significant 
problem for anyone wanting to do business online. 
Situating Smart Contracts within Contract 
Theory
Smart contracts enabled by blockchain technology are 
programmable applications that manage exchanges 
conducted online. Those exchanges would usually be 
an asset in exchange for value (but could be an asset in 
exchange for another asset, or one value for another 
value that is in a different currency). In the case of 
blockchain technology, value may be represented by a 
digital token, such as Bitcoin or other cryptocurrency. 
Much of the discussion around smart contracts enabled 
by blockchain technology has focused on whether or 
not they operate in the same way as legal contracts. 
However, legal contracts are not usually the focus of 
discussion when exchanges are conducted offline. This 
disconnect between the treatment of exchanges man-
aged by smart contracts and exchanges in the analogue 
Much of the discussion around blockchain-based smart contracts has focused on 
whether or not they operate in the same way as legal contracts. However, it is argued 
that most contracts are social rather than legal in nature and are entered into because 
the parties trust each other to perform the agreed exchange. Little has been written to 
address how the blockchain’s trust protocol can enable the kind of social contracting 
that characterized the way exchanges were conducted before the Internet. This article 
aims to fill that gap by exploring blockchain-based smart contracts primarily as non-
contractual social exchanges.
A contract is not sufficient unto itself, but is possible 
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world is probably due to a combination of factors in-
cluding the word “contract” in the term “smart con-
tract”, and also the claim made by many blockchain 
developers and advocates that this innovative techno-
logy can provide and manage trust between the parties. 
There is a further important factor that considers the 
nature of contractual relationships: they are often foun-
ded on custom and conversation. According to Dod-
dridge, legal principles are derived from logic, natural 
philosophy, cannon, and finally, from “the customs and 
conversations of men” (Doddridge, 1630).
In order to distinguish contracts established by custom 
and conversation from those that are founded on terms 
and conditions, it is useful to reflect on existing contrac-
tual theory. For example, Weber’s (1922) distinction 
with an analysis of freedom of contract between what 
he described in the 1920s as the traditional “status con-
tract” and the (then) modern “purposive contract”. The 
former describes the complex social web of inter-rela-
tionships that arise when members of a community 
contract with each other to meet their economic and 
personal needs. The contracting members of this eco-
system changes organically as they enter into agree-
ments to accommodate the symbiotic relationship with 
the other members of the network. The latter (that is 
the “purposive contract”) refers to legal claims made by 
one against another without necessarily being person-
ally acquainted with each other. This discussion readily 
applies to the consideration of the use and legal implic-
ations of smart contracts because so much of the dis-
course around smart contracts has so far concentrated 
on their legality and how contracting parties will assert 
their rights and obligations. However, it is suggested 
here that their use is more social than legal and that the 
status of the parties to a smart contract prevails over 
their legal relationship. Indeed, when most people con-
duct business over the Internet, they are less interested 
in the legal consequences of those transactions than 
the interconnectedness that results from the exchange. 
This can be seen in the way that people rate their exper-
iences on eBay, Uber, and TripAdvisor. Users of these 
service providers rate their experience with the vendor 
based on the quality and timeliness of the delivery of 
the service or product. These ratings create reputation 
for the service provider and build relationships of trust 
in the network or community. Even though the nature 
of the marketplace means that participants will very 
likely never meet, their interactions give rise to ex-
changes where the parties to the transaction are relying 
on each other’s status established through these con-
versations, rather than their strict legal rights expressed 
in terms and conditions. 
At the time that Weber was writing about economy and 
society in 1920s Germany, electricity was powering 
small-scale domestic appliances, including lights, sew-
ing machines, telephones, recording equipment, and 
fans. As soon as a premises was connected to electri-
city, the business or householder could buy and use 
lights and appliances powered by electricity. To pay for 
this service, a contract arrangement would be entered 
into between the customer and the electricity com-
pany. Electricity companies employed and trained 
meter readers to attended to households and to note 
down exact consumption in order to generate a bill so 
that the owner or tenant of the premises could pay their 
usage, usually on a monthly basis. The meter reading, 
the calculation of consumption, the generation of the 
bill, and the payment were all conducted manually.
Clearly, smart contracts can manage financial interac-
tions between machines, vehicles, humans, regulators, 
government, and financial service providers. Indeed, 
many of these processes are already managed online 
via processes that are automated. However, at this 
time, some steps along the path still require human in-
tervention. For example, in order to pay for electricity, a 
service provider needs to calculate the amount owing 
by measuring consumption and then applying a for-
mula that generates an invoice. These processes (the re-
gister of consumption, the calculation of the amount 
owing, the generation of the invoice, and its delivery via 
email) are all currently automated and (as long as there 
are no disputes) they require no human intervention. 
The only step along the way that requires a human to 
do something is when customer pays the invoice. 
If the human steps are to be replaced by automated 
processes, then it is important to ensure that this step 
emulates the appropriate human interaction. For ex-
ample, if the payment of an electricity bill is currently 
done by authorizing a funds transfer from the custom-
er’s bank account to the electricity company’s bank ac-
count and nothing more, then the automated processes 
should simply emulate this process. A smart contract 
could manage all of these steps without the need for 
any intervention. Any requirement to enter a password 
or in some other way to verify the customer’s authoriza-
tion of the payment can be readily bypassed by provid-
ing pre-authorization for all of these types of payments. 
The pre-authorization and direct funds transfer of pay-
ments to financial organizations and other service pro-
viders has been a part of the online banking ecosystem 
for more than two decades. Including this step in smart 
contracts is a next logical step in the way that online 
transactions will be managed.
Smart Contract Relations in e-Commerce: Legal Implications of Exchanges 
Conducted on the Blockchain  Philippa Ryan
Technology Innovation Management Review October 2017 (Volume 7, Issue 10)
12www.timreview.ca
It is important to note in this description of how we use 
and pay for electricity that a close reading of the terms 
and conditions of use of the electricity and the legal im-
plications or obligations that arise from incurring a 
debt to the electricity company are not usually re-
garded as a necessary step in making such an arrange-
ment. This is because the human experience of 
consuming and paying for utilities, products, and ser-
vices such as water, gas, electricity, garbage collection, 
sanitation, food, petrol, and public transport is a cus-
tom with which most people are familiar. 
In the day-to-day workings of developed economies, 
few disputes arise between consumers and those who 
deliver and sell these types of goods and services. Legal 
scholarship that focuses on the contract lawsuit, as op-
posed to contractual relationships, creates a distortion 
of most social norms and economic systems (Macaulay, 
1977). Since the advent of the Internet, many of the pay-
ments and invoices for these transactions are managed 
online, but the nature of the exchanges remains a social 
experience. These types of contracts are very different 
in nature to the purchase of a business or an invest-
ment in property. These commercial arrangements re-
quire due diligence to be conducted on the target and 
perhaps legal advice in relation to the terms and condi-
tions upon which the purchase or investment will be 
made. 
Weber’s (1922) understanding of different types of con-
tracts is applicable to an analysis of how smart con-
tracts will fit into our future of online exchanges and it 
favours the characterization of these relations as con-
versational and social, rather than strictly legal and pur-
posive.
The question of whether or not a smart contract is also 
a legal contract is only necessary when considering its 
use. In most cases, the answer will be more intuitive 
than deliberate. This reflects the way that contracts are 
currently conducted both online and offline. It is usu-
ally unnecessary because smart contracts are a thor-
oughly modern extension of Weber’s notion of a 
conversational or social relationship, and they are an 
example of the law “in action” as opposed to the law 
“on the books” (Leib & Eigen, 2017).
The way that contracts are experienced is not so much 
about the law as it is about human interaction. Con-
tract formation and enforcement are almost entirely 
about the law of the threat of legal enforcement in case 
a dispute arises. This is understood in the context of so-
cial contracts. The types of contracts that demand close 
attention to and legal expression of the terms and con-
ditions are those that give rise to enduring relationships 
that require significant investment or those that expose 
one or both parties to high levels of risk. The need to re-
duce terms to a written contract rarely arises in relation 
to small, low-risk, ongoing transactions. 
In the modern age of smart contracts, much of this hu-
man interaction is online. Archetypal contracts are con-
tracts derived from an archetypal set of exchange 
conditions. These conditions include some bilateral, 
pre-consent negotiation, a general understanding by 
both parties that an enforceable obligation is being un-
dertaken, a general understanding of the terms, a gener-
al understanding of the consequences of breach of 
those terms, and some direct or indirect relationship 
between the benefit of the bargain and the contract it-
self (Kastner, 2010). These foundational components of 
the collective imagination about “contract” sustain its 
sociological and normative legitimacy (Eigen, 2008). It 
is these descriptions of contract that are found in legal 
textbooks. However, modern online exchanges do not 
include the traditional behavioural characteristics of 
contract formation. Whereas traditional offline con-
tracts were sealed with a handshake or a signature, 
modern online exchanges can be agreed to with a click 
(Eigen, 2008). Examples of this modern exchange would 
be the online purchase of digital music or the place-
ment of a bid via online auction sites, which often re-
quires pre-registration with a credit card and then the 
click of a button during the live auction. There are more 
sophisticated ways to shop online for physical items 
that emulate the offline retail shopping experience. For 
example, purchasing a product from a digital store in-
volves selecting the item and its addition to a “shopping 
cart”, the option to “continue shopping”, and then the 
payment for all items in the cart at the virtual “check-
out”. Online shopping is not a radical departure from 
the way that the common law regards the shopping ex-
perience. The moment when the contract is entered in-
to happens when the customer makes the offer to 
purchase at the checkout. As Somervell (1953) noted, 
when the customer reaches the checkout, they can re-
move items from the cart and then choose to authorize 
payment. This analysis applies to both online and in-
store (that is, offline) purchases. If an online purchase is 
one that is available to any shopper, then in most cases, 
there is no need for the vendor to refuse the customer’s 
offer to purchase the items and make the payment. 
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This article applies Macaulay’s work in the 1960s and 
1970s to the modern experience of smart contracts and, 
by analogy, to the trust mechanisms provided and man-
aged by blockchain technology. In doing so, it is argued 
that smart contracts enabled by the blockchain are the 
archetype of contract in action, as opposed to contrac-
tual doctrine. The legal implications for blockchain are 
that its online exchanges will align closely to Ma-
caulay’s notion of non-contractual or social relations. 
Discussion about the nature of online exchanges con-
ducted via smart contracts is better suited to a behavi-
oural analysis of business exchanges than a doctrinal 
analysis of the law of contract.
Macaulay’s Behavioural Analysis of Tradi-
tional Business Exchanges
According to Macaulay’s behavioural analysis of tradi-
tional business exchanges (Macaulay, 1963), most con-
tracts are examples of the law in action. The law in 
action refers to how people and businesses use con-
tracts to manage their lives; how disputes in the per-
formance of contracts arise and are settled; and how 
the resolution of disputes affects the parties to the dis-
putes and influences future parties to contracts. The 
emphasis is on what happens on the ground, empiric-
ally, not on what theoretically should or probably 
would happen if certain assumptions were true (Ma-
caulay & Whitford, 2015). It is argued here that this ap-
proach to the discussion of contracts is readily 
applicable to the way that humans will use most block-
chain-based smart contracts. Of course, there will al-
ways be exceptions. The law and human experience 
generally have always managed to articulate excep-
tions. However, most contracts are social exchanges 
and most are conducted with little dispute, and most 
disputes are resolved by the participants without re-
course to the law or lawyers. 
For any contract system to function well, trust is an es-
sential element (Eigen, 2008). Beale and Dugdale (1975) 
described similar dynamics in the relationships 
between engineering firms in Bristol, England. Again, 
this was research conducted in the mid-1970s pre-Inter-
net era and at least a decade before there was any no-
tion that business exchanges could be conducted 
online. Beale and Dugdale noted that the manufactur-
ing companies spent minimal timing in contract plan-
ning. They surmised that was likely due to the existing 
familiarity between the companies. Because the parties 
to the transactions trusted each other, they perceived a 
low level of risk in their business dealings. Under these 
circumstances, any extensive negotiations would lead to 
delay and expense that was disproportionate to the risk 
of dispute. It was also observed that manufacturers 
were also concerned that too much negotiation might 
sour an otherwise peaceful relationship and break down 
important bonds of trust (Scott, 1997).
Social contracting is usually managed by codes of beha-
viour that direct the parties as to how they should be-
have (Scott, 1997). This is in contradistinction to the 
law, which operates to tell the parties what they must 
not do and what they must do. The difference is a ques-
tion of mode/strength of enforcement: social norms are 
enforced by ostracism; positive law is enforced by sanc-
tion as expressed by a court order at the end of a litigi-
ous process. Social norms in contracting are important 
because they may be industry-specific and even con-
trary to the exact letter of the law. The relationship 
between the parties and their relative bargaining power 
will usually dictate whether one of the parties (usually 
the weaker of the two) will seek legal advice prior to con-
tracting. However, most of the exchanges that happen 
online between organizations and consumers or cus-
tomers do not involve large transactions and therefore 
would not justify the expense of seeking legal advice. 
The question of how online contracts are formed and 
the social norms that keep the parties from involving 
their lawyers is more relevant in the discussion of com-
panies and firms doing business online with other busi-
ness or industry organizations.
Behavioural Analysis of Business Exchanges 
as Applied to Smart Contracts
Bitcoin (bitcoin.org) is an electronic payment system em-
ploying cryptographic proof, instead of trust, in order to 
ensure that reversal of a transaction, once entered into, 
is impossible. Bitcoin was the first application to utilize 
what has become known as blockchain technology. 
Blockchain uses peer-to-peer data and certain of Bit-
coin’s components in order to reduce the need for trus-
ted third parties in mediating bilateral 
communications. Blockchain technology enables an 
electronic payment system based on cryptographic 
proof that hashes and timestamps transactions into an 
ongoing chain of hash-based proof of work, allowing 
any two willing parties to transact directly with each oth-
er without the need for a trusted third party (Nakamoto, 
2009). Smart contracts on blockchain networks are the 
next logical progression for the Internet. The Internet 
and globalization disrupted in many ways Macaulay’s 
notion of social contracting. Business conducted online, 
Technology Innovation Management Review October 2017 (Volume 7, Issue 10)
14www.timreview.ca
Smart Contract Relations in e-Commerce: Legal Implications of Exchanges 
Conducted on the Blockchain  Philippa Ryan
in different parts of the world, and in different time-
frames does not lend itself to brief conversations and 
handshakes. Establishing trust and reputation in online 
exchanges has been a challenge for e-commerce.
Blockchain technology can streamline online exchanges 
and reduce corruption, mistakes, fraud, and tax evasion. 
This is possible because blockchain technology is at its 
least the most reliable online tracking system yet de-
veloped. With a timestamp server, a chain of 
timestamps is created that publishes the hash of the 
transaction and proves the data must have existed at a 
particular time. The proof-of-work system involves scan-
ning for value and ensuring that it cannot be changed 
(Nakamoto, 2009). 
Blockchain can provide and build trust and reputation
Bitcoin operates on a blockchain network that has been 
touted since its inception as being “trustless”. In this 
context, “trustless” does not mean that the participants 
on the network cannot be trusted. Instead, it means that 
there is no need for a trusted third party. Without a trus-
ted party, transactions must be publicly announced. 
This is achieved via a system that allows participants to 
agree on a single history of the order in which transac-
tions were received. The payee needs proof that, at the 
time of each transaction, the majority of nodes agreed it 
was the first received (Nakamoto, 2009). 
For exchanges conducted purely online, there is little 
risk that one of the parties will not fulfil their part of the 
deal. This is because both the payment and the delivery 
are executed by the smart contract. The blockchain 
manages the exchange of the two. This scenario saves 
time and costs. It means that the parties to a transaction 
take a much more active role in meeting their respective 
obligations. The exchanges feel almost cash-like in their 
immediacy and immutability. Because transactions can-
not be reversed, the need for trust is eliminated (Na-
kamoto, 2009). With these mechanisms in play, the 
network can advertise to everyone that a transaction has 
been completed and the reputation of the participants 
in the completed exchange is enhanced automatically 
for all to observe.
However, online transactions become a bit more com-
plicated when the exchange is payment for the delivery 
of a physical item, for example a widget. The delivery of 
a widget would be managed off-chain and would re-
quire human intervention to complete delivery. In this 
case, one solution is for the smart contract to provide an 
escrow service until such time that the widget has been 
successfully delivered. Of course, this may reduce the 
risk for the party paying for the widget (they will not au-
thorize release of the funds on escrow to the sender un-
til they receive the widget), but it leaves the sender 
exposed to two obvious risks. The first risk is that the 
party receiving the widget does not release the funds 
from escrow. However, this risk is quite low as the 
terms of the escrow will mean that the funds remain 
held in suspense until the dispute about delivery of the 
widget is resolved. The second risk to the sender is that 
the widget is sent to the wrong recipient, stolen, or not 
delivered for some other reason. In this case, the sender 
has parted with the item but has not been paid. This 
second risk can eventuate as readily off-line and off-
chain as it can on-chain. The blockchain does not give 
rise to the risk of the missing widget and it cannot elim-
inate it. Equally, the presence of a bank or trusted third 
party would not have reduced or eliminated that risk. 
In practical terms, where the transaction value is low, 
the party at risk is likely (implicitly) to assume (that is, 
accept) the risk. When the transaction value is high, the 
risk solution probably lies in an insurance policy.
As we can see, these qualities of blockchain technology 
as applied to commercial transactions are not absolute, 
but are dependent on the circumstances.
To appreciate the importance of proving and managing 
trust in e-commerce, it is important to consider the no-
tion of uncertainty, perceived risk, and unreliability. 
The more certain the parties are that something will 
happen, the less they need to consider whether or not 
they trust it (Christopher, 2017). When business is con-
ducted online, trust becomes even more important. 
The usual norms associated with personal contact and 
social interaction are not available. The parties cannot 
rely on their intuitive judgements about a person’s 
trustworthiness. This is why credit card companies are 
enlisted for these transactions – the credit card provider 
has done the due diligence.
In order to eliminate credit card companies and other 
trusted (but expensive) third parties from the transac-
tion network, the blockchain has mechanisms to build 
reputation for its participants.
Trust is built when the blockchain confirms to the en-
tire network that a transaction was completed. Building 
reputation requires a broader dynamic. The ability to 
assess the reputation of a member in an online com-
munity is an essential need that arose with the launch 
of the Internet. The reputation gained by sellers and 
Technology Innovation Management Review October 2017 (Volume 7, Issue 10)
15www.timreview.ca
Smart Contract Relations in e-Commerce: Legal Implications of Exchanges 
Conducted on the Blockchain  Philippa Ryan
buyers in e-commerce communities like eBay is based 
on the feedback they provide about each other after the 
conclusion of a commercial transaction. This reputa-
tion rating system is vital for all e-commerce because 
reputation creates trust, and without trust there can be 
no commerce (Rietjens, 2006, 55).
Many Bitcoin exchanges have designed trading plat-
forms that provide information about the number of 
trades undertaken by each trader and the ratings 
provided by other users. The feedback is represented by 
colour-coded dots and percentage rankings to reflect 
each trader’s level of recent trading activity and the sat-
isfaction of their customers. However, these apps are 
not built into the blockchain network and so suffer 
from a lack of decentralization; they depend upon the 
trustworthiness of those providing the feedback.
It is an essential ingredient of any e-commerce reputa-
tion system to manage the integrity of feedback and to 
ensure that it is provided only by genuine users (and 
not, for example, by fake identities created by the per-
son or persons who want to synthesize an improve-
ment in their reputation). Anyone can browse eBay, but 
in order to join in the business of this community, buy-
ers and sellers must first be registered with the plat-
form. Exchanges are only possible when users are 
signed into the system with their unique identities. 
Users do not usually use their real name or identity on 
eBay. Instead, users have a pseudonym (for example, 
“carlover” or “allroundaussie”). Although these pseud-
onyms protect the privacy of the members of the com-
munity, they are linked back to genuine pre-validated 
email addresses and credit cards. This system ensures 
that real people are the puppet-masters of their avatars 
and that they must behave according the rules of the 
marketplace. Under the rating system, the more stars 
received by a member, the more reliable and trust-
worthy they are, increasing their popularity with other 
members, and thereby resulting in significant econom-
ic advantages for those users (Kollock, 1999).
In the case of reputation of goods and services and their 
suppliers, the solutions available to prevent feedback 
abuse are generally reliable but centralized under the 
control of a few large Internet companies. However, by 
building a decentralized and distributed feedback man-
agement system on top of the blockchain, it is possible 
to provide reliable reputation ratings (Carboni, 2015). A 
key feature of this system would be to attach more 
weight to the feedback of an established and trusted 
user on the network than new identities.
This is important for anyone wanting to conduct busi-
ness with a particular person or organization for the 
first time. eBay manages this by allowing new sellers to 
offer only a small number of items for sale until they 
reach a certain level of trustworthiness, as established 
by the feedback ratings from those first-run customers. 
Reputation is preserved in this way as a reflection of 
how much the users of a network trust another parti-
cipant. 
The Legal Implications for Blockchain and 
the Law in Action
There are two approaches for parties to adopt when 
agreeing to manage their financial and asset exchanges 
via a smart contract. First, they can let all of the pro-
grammable logic and code in the smart contract repres-
ent the agreed terms and conditions. The problem 
with this approach is that it may be difficult for one of 
the parties to know how to read the code and therefore 
understand how it will behave. The second approach is 
for the parties to share an external document that dis-
closes all the legal terms and conditions that will bind 
the parties and that may in part also reflect the way 
that the smart contract will behave. This too has its 
dangers. For example, it would be important to ensure 
that whatever is said in the external document accords 
with the way that the code will behave. Relying on the 
established doctrine of mistake, the parties would by 
mutual agreement or upon receipt of a court order 
modify the code of a smart contract to reflect their ac-
tual intention. This should be sufficient to ameliorate 
any concerns arising from the very real possibility of 
mistake.
If trust has already been established between the 
parties, there will be little cause for concern as to what 
the code will do or whether or not there is an external 
document that articulates in plain English (for ex-
ample) the way that the code will behave. There are 
certain behaviours in the physical world that are un-
desirable and obstructive in business, but which are 
circumvented by smart contracts. For example, oppres-
sion, delay, or hold up. Hold up occurs when one con-
tracting party threatens another with economic harm 
unless they grant a concession of some sort to the 
threatening party. When a smart contract is managing 
the exchange between the parties, the obligations on 
both sides of the transaction are effected simultan-
eously and subject to the agreed terms that have been 
coded into the application. The nature of smart con-
tracts confines their use to certain types of online 
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transactions or transactions where payment will be 
automated upon the tracking of a certain event. This 
makes it difficult for one of the parties to cause delay in 
delivery or payment.
Because contracts are social tools as well as legal instru-
ments, expectations and relationships are as important 
in contracting as legal obligations (Levy, 2017). In an 
online business environment, it may be easier to com-
municate to the rest of the community (for example via 
social media) if there is an untrustworthy participant, 
but the system is not immune to malicious attacks. Be-
cause reputation is built on feedback, the effect of this 
phenomenon makes it more problematic for business 
to suffer a bad review than to be sued for failing to meet 
a certain obligation under a contract. Any self-correct-
ing mechanism could enhance the trust protocols that 
underpin the technology. This issue supports the case 
for a decentralized and possibly incentivized feedback-
based reputation system to be built into blockchain 
technology.
What is missing from this discussion are the obvious 
problems that may arise when a smart contract fails to 
deliver on its promise or does not behave in a way that 
was expected by the parties. The legal consequences of 
these circumstances give rise to their own peculiar 
problems. For example, identifying pseudonymous 
parties, deciding jurisdiction, and options for the non-
litigious resolution of the dispute. These problems vary 
in magnitude and volume depending upon the types of 
blockchain networks and environments that underpin 
the smart contracting. For example, the public Bitcoin 
blockchain is permissionless and operates as a financial 
transaction network. These smart contracts have very 
different features to those that may arise in private 
chains, where users are known to the system. 
The problems arising where the users are known only 
by their pseudonyms and where jurisdiction is in dis-
pute are more relevant to and prevalent in a public 
chain environment. However, these problems are not 
insuperable and nearly always arise in large public 
blockchain environments (such as Bitcoin). If the 
parties know each other and could have resolved these 
matters in an analogue transaction, there is no impedi-
ment to them resolving or prosecuting a dispute in the 
usual way.
Conclusion
In summary, this analysis has focused on the way that 
blockchain’s trust and reputation protocols have re-
stored to online business some of the features of social 
contracting that were lost with the advent of the Inter-
net. Blockchain-enabled smart contracts bring more cer-
tainty and reliability to online transactions than has 
been available to e-commerce environments for the past 
twenty years.
It is clear that smart contracts will serve an important 
function in the automation of transactions as more of 
our business and social exchanges migrate to pro-
grammed applications and platforms that manage our 
online relationships. To ensure this smooth transition 
and to support the network of social contracts that sit 
within this ecosystem, it is important to keep in mind 
that not all transactions and exchanges are purposively 
contractual in a legal sense. Those who program and use 
smart contracts will benefit from delineating between 
social exchanges versus commercial contracts, as well as 
contracts that create enduring relationships from those 
that manage more casual affairs. Smart contracts can de-
liver significant benefits to the way that we manage sup-
ply chains and regulate variable payments. As research 
continues into the use of smart contracts, it will be use-
ful to look at the way that different types of social ex-
changes are conducted in the analogue (offline) world, 
in order to emulate that experience online. 
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